Why Can Many People Understand Chen Sheng and Wu Guang, But Find It Hard to Sympathize with Huang Chao?

Author / Monkey Commune

After Emperor Gaozu of Han, Liu Bang, ascended the throne, he did something particularly interesting.

He issued an edict to arrange for thirty households in Dang to act as tomb guardians for Chen Sheng, the long-dead leader of the Daze Village Uprising.

What does this mean? It means he specifically allocated thirty households to serve Chen Sheng's tomb and incense offerings for generations. When Sima Qian wrote the Records of the Grand Historian, this account was still recorded: "To this day, he enjoys blood sacrifices."

You must understand that by this time, the Han dynasty was already firmly established. What was Chen Sheng's status? He was a failed rebel, a "bandit." Yet Liu Bang insisted on enshrining this "bandit," offering sacrifices to him as if he were a prince or noble.

I think that although Liu Bang was of rogue origins, at such a crucial historical juncture of right and wrong, he was an exceptionally clear-minded man—he knew in his heart that half of the Han dynasty's legitimacy was achieved by standing on Chen Sheng's shoulders.

By enshrining Chen Sheng, he was actually telling the world: I, Liu Bang, am not a usurper; I am the inheritor of Chen Sheng's great cause of opposing Qin.

This move of "taking over the mantle" was executed brilliantly. He directly elevated Chen Sheng from the position of a "bandit" to that of a "king," and his own starting position naturally rose with the tide.

Later, when Sima Qian wrote the Records of the Grand Historian, he went with the flow and simply placed Chen Sheng into the "Hereditary Houses" section.

You see, "Hereditary Houses" was a section reserved for vassal kings. Historically, apart from the supreme sage Confucius, only Chen Sheng, this rebel leader, managed to squeeze in.

Confucius entered the Hereditary Houses because he was a sage; Chen Sheng was a failed rebel of hired peasant origin, so on what basis could he squeeze in? He relied on the fact that the Han dynasty needed his legitimacy.

You see, this is the paradox of history. Sometimes, your fate is not in your own hands, but in the hands of those who "take over your mantle."

I once wondered, why is it that with both raising the banner of rebellion and both making the old dynasty utterly miserable, later generations can understand Chen Sheng and Wu Guang, but find it hard to sympathize with Huang Chao? Even many people, upon mentioning Huang Chao, immediately think of a bloodthirsty demon.

In terms of talent and boldness, it can be said that Huang Chao is in no way inferior to Chen Sheng—

He was the son of a salt merchant who repeatedly failed the imperial examinations. In terms of education, he left Chen Sheng in the dust. The ruthless ambition and aspiration in his poem, "Its sky-reaching fragrance permeates Chang'an," truly strikes deep into one's heart;

He led the rebel army across more than half of China, captured Chang'an twice, and massacred the aristocratic families until rivers of blood flowed. "The inner treasury burned to ashes of brocade, the heavenly streets trampled with the bones of nobles"—he utterly ended three hundred years of aristocratic politics since the Wei and Jin dynasties...

Purely from the perspective of historical process, Huang Chao's destructive power was much greater than Chen Sheng's, and his contribution was actually not small.

But if you connect it with the history of the late Tang and Five Dynasties, you can see more than a few clues from the perspective of why later generations could understand Chen Sheng and Wu Guang but would not sympathize with Huang Chao.

In fact, Huang Chao's tragedy lies not in his taking up arms, but in that, unlike Chen Sheng, there was no one to take over his mantle after him; instead, there was only a bunch of opportunistic profiteers stirring up trouble.

Huang Chao's rebellion directly led to the fall of the Tang dynasty, but who took the baton? Zhu Wen.

Zhu Wen was originally Huang Chao's general; he later defected to the Tang, bit back at his old master, and finally usurped the Tang to establish the Later Liang.

What came next? What followed was the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms, where one faction took the stage after another.

Think about it, in just over fifty years, the Central Plains saw five dynasties and more than a dozen emperors. You take the stage today, I get beheaded tomorrow; the common people lived lives worse than dogs.

The historians of later generations calculated this account clearly. Since the Later Liang didn't secure its footing, who among the subsequent Later Tang, Later Jin, Later Han, Later Zhou, and even the Great Song, would be willing to admit they belonged to the lineage of Huang Chao and Zhu Wen? No one.

The Later Tang proclaimed itself the rebirth of the Great Tang from the ashes; since it wanted to restore the Great Tang, Huang Chao was naturally a traitorous rebel;

When the Later Jin compiled the Old Book of Tang, in order to completely nail the Tang dynasty into its coffin, they had to portray Huang Chao, who caused the Tang's demise, as the chief culprit...

Thus, we see such an absurd statement in the Old Book of Tang: "At that time, the empire had been at peace for so long that the people knew nothing of war."

This is simply keeping one's eyes open and telling lies.

When Huang Chao took up arms, the Great Tang had long been riddled with holes from the An Lushan Rebellion, with regional warlords carving out their own territories, Chang'an falling six times, and the emperor fleeing nine times. Where was this long peace?

So the question arises: why did the historians write it this way?

Because only by writing the Tang dynasty as good and Huang Chao as bad could they prove that the subsequent overthrowers of the Tang were "bringing order out of chaos" rather than looting a burning house.

This shows one thing: historical evaluation is never objective; it is a narrative constructed by the victors to consolidate their system.

Chen Sheng was fortunate because he died early, didn't have time to make big mistakes, and had the Han dynasty backing him up;

Huang Chao was unfortunate because he lived too long, left too many messes behind, and was only followed by a group of mutually attacking warlords.

The entire history of historical evaluation in ancient China actually highly follows this "law of taking over the mantle"—

If a destroyer is followed by a builder who can establish a new order, then he is a pioneer;

If he is followed by an even more chaotic era, then he is a sinner.

Ultimately, even in a grand proposition like historical evaluation, its essence is never a moral judgment, but a cost accounting.

Chen Sheng's "righteousness" is because the Han dynasty paid the cost of rebuilding order for him;

Huang Chao's "banditry" is because the common people were forced to foot the bill for the chaotic era he left behind.

This is precisely the underlying logic of social operation: destruction is always easier than construction, but only builders deserve the right of interpretation.

And this is also the most secular lesson that Chen Sheng and Huang Chao left us: a good beginning is not as good as a good end; breaking the deadlock is not as good as closing the deal.

Being able to turn a mess into good days is true ability; conversely, no matter how good the original intention, it merely adds a few lines of blood and tears to the history books.

Source: Zhihu Daily